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Abstract 
This paper will examine a number of widely shared views in academia in reference to the 
human embryo, fetus, more recently newborns with regards to a few key controversial and 
contested points of dispute. This paper will examine various arguments made to justify abortion 
and infanticide but which are suspect when considered on the level of consistency with regards 
to other practices that such proponents would conceivably reject such as enslaving adult human 
beings or actual human persons. It is widely held that the embryo’s, fetus’s and newborn’s 
potential to become a person is not sufficient to condemn abortion and infanticide. It is also held 
in some circles that there are grounds to be skeptical on whether a threshold of personhood or 
full moral status exists and whether human equality is simply a pragmatically useful concept as 
opposed to reflecting reality. This paper will argue that defenders of the permissibility of 
abortion and infanticide must appeal to the human person’s potential to develop in such a way 
that would make enslaving her as morally wrong but that such a task cannot be consistently 
done without resorting to ad hoc assumptions. This paper will finally argue that skepticism 
about an adequate threshold of personhood undermines the full moral status principle for all 
human persons and maintains that – on their own grounds – enslaving actual human persons 
cannot in principle be morally wrong and rejected. 
 
 
 
